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Abstract: We study recent changes in the geographic distances between small businesses and their bank lenders, 
using a large random sample of loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. Consistent with extant 
research, we find that small borrower-lender distances generally increased between 1984 and 2001, with a rapid 
acceleration in distance beginning in the late-1990s. We also document a new phenomenon: a fundamental 
reordering of borrower-lender distance by the borrowers’ neighborhood income and race characteristics. 
Historically, borrower-lender distance tended to be shorter than average for historically underserved (for example, 
low-income and minority) areas, but by 2000 borrowers in these areas tended to be farther away from their lenders 
on average. This structural change is coincident in time with the adoption of credit scoring models that rely on 
automated lending processes and quantitative information, and we find indirect evidence consistent with this link. 
Our findings suggest that there has been increased entry into local markets for small business loans and this should 
help allay fears that movement toward automated lending processes will reduce small businesses’ access to credit in 
already underserved markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
A great deal of policy attention has been paid i n recent decades to small business credit access, 
especially for firms located in historically underserved (e.g., low-to-moderate income and predominantly 
minority) communities.  Small firms are viewed as a critical component of the U.S. economy in general, 
as well as a  particularly  important avenue of advancement  for individuals living and working  in 
historically underserved neighborhoods.  The public policy commitment to increasing credit access for 
small businesses  operating  in  these  areas  is  evidenced b y  a number of  U.S.  Small  Business 
Administration (SBA) initiatives—such as the expansion of loan guarantee programs, enhanced access to 
government procurement channels, and special loan programs for minority-owned businesses—as well as 
by recent amendments to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) that required banks to report more 
information to regulators about their small business lending activities.   
A major economic rationale for these policy interventions is the belief that small firms can find it 
difficult to find funding  for creditworthy (i.e., positive net present value) projects, because potential 
providers of funds  lack of credible information about these firms.
1  Specifically, s mall businesses 
typically have neither certified audited financial statements nor publicly traded equity or debt.  These 
informational  asymmetries can result in problems of adverse selection, leading to credit rationing that 
excludes both good- and bad-credit risk firms from funding (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  Local banks can 
be better situated to  mitigate  these  informational asymmetries, through  the formation of long-term 
relationships based on repeated interactions with the borrowers, their suppliers, and their customers.
2  
Studies using data from the Federal Reserve’s  National Survey of Small Business Finance have 
demonstrated that small firms rely on bank finance as their primary source of credit (Elliehausen and 
                                                             
1 Another important rationale is fairness and social equity, a topic that is tangential to our investigation. 
2 Indeed, theoretical work suggests that the very existence of banks and other financial intermediaries is predicated 
on the existence of information asymmetries (e.g., Diamond 1984, 1991; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984).     1
Wolken 1990, 1992; Kwast, Starr-McCluer and Wolken 1997) and that close bank-borrower relationships 
improve the availability and price of credit for small borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Berger and 
Udell 1995).
3   
In contrast, l arge centralized lenders may be less well equipped to serve small business credit 
markets  because it is difficult to communicate non-quantitative, or “soft,” information about small 
borrower creditworthiness within these complex organizational structures.  Evidence suggests that large 
banks are at a comparative disadvantage in relationship lending due to diseconomies of scale in the 
transmission and processing of soft information (Stein 2002) as well as agency problems between loan 
officers and bank managers (Berger and Udell 2002).
4  Loan officer turnover is a relatively frequent 
occurrence at large, multi-office banks and some research suggests that this  has a disruptive effect on 
credit availability at banks that use soft information to make credit decisions (Scott 2006).   
Because it is costly to produce this soft information about borrowers, banks of all sizes may 
(illegally) use the demographic characteristics of small business owners (e.g., race, gender) and/or general 
demographic knowledge about  the areas in which these businesses  live and  operate  (e.g., average 
household incomes) as proxies for borrower creditworthiness and loan profitability.  For example, a 
number of studies have documented large differences in loan denials and credit access between small 
firms owned by white men and other small firms (e.g., Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998; Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002; Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman 2003).   
Despite this, recent research suggests that small business credit markets may be in the early stages 
of transformation similar to that experienced in consumer credit markets during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Home mortgages, auto loans, and credit card receivables have essentially become financial commodities, 
produced and traded without regard to the geography of borrowers and lenders.  This transformation from 
relationship lending to transactions lending  has i mproved household access to credit, and was made 
                                                             
3 One exception to this rule is for small firms owned by women, which are less likely to use commercial banks for 
their financial services (Haynes and Haynes 1999; Cole, and Wolken 1995; and Scherr, Sugrue, and Ward 1993).  
4 Empirical evidence consistent with these findings is provided by Cole, Goldberg, and White (2004) and Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005).   2
possible by advances in information technologies, innovations in financial markets, and geographic 
banking deregulation.  There is growing evidence of similar changes emerging in the production of small 
business l oans.  Using various data sources, several studies have documented a modest increase in the 
distance between U.S. small business borrowers and their bank  lenders in recent years (Petersen and 
Rajan 2002; Hannan 2003; DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (forthcoming)).  These findings are consistent 
with the technology-driven transformations of consumer credit markets, and may in large part be driven 
by the introduction of credit-scoring methods.  One piece of evidence comes from Frame, Padhi, and 
Woosley (2004) who found that large banks using small business credit scoring ( hereafter,  SBCS) 
engaged in more lending in 1997 than non-scoring large banks, and that this net increase in small business 
loans came from outside their local markets (coupled with a net decline i n lending within their local 
markets).
5   
The SBCS  approach to lending analyzes personal financial  data about the owner of the firm 
(largely from his/her behavior as a consumer borrower), combined with relatively limited loan application 
and financial statement data from the firm, and then uses these data in statistical models that predict future 
credit performance (e.g., Mester 1997).  Lenders appear to use SBCS either as a less expensive alternative 
to other lending technologies or as a supplement to traditional underwriting approaches that i mproves 
information quality and decision-making (e.g., Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005).  Hence, SBCS may be an 
important innovation for expanding small business credit access: it shrinks borrower-lender information 
gaps, lessens borrower’s reliance on close bank relationships, and/or reduces banks’ costs of screening 
and monitoring distant borrowers.  Whether and how SBCS  might affect lending differently in  lower 
income and/or predominantly minority areas, however, is unclear.  By mitigating the especially difficult 
asymmetric information problems in these markets, lenders may be less likely to rely on the physical 
location of the business (a.k.a. “redlining”) or the racial identity of the loan applicant (discrimination) as 
                                                             
5 A related paper by Brevoort and Hannan (forthcoming) reports that borrower-lender distance within nine U.S. 
metropolitan areas actually decreased between 1997 and 2001, consistent with relationship-dependent borrowers 
abandoning SBCS-based lenders in favor of relationship-based lenders.   3
crude proxies  for  loan risk.
6  In contrast, SBCS could impede credit flows to borrowers with limited 
personal financial histories (i.e., thin credit files), which makes these borrowers less likely to fit a “cookie 
cutter” approach to lending like SBCS. 
In this paper, we examine commercial lending distances using a large random sample of small 
business loans originated between 1984 and 2001 and guaranteed by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA).  Our evidence suggests that recent innovations in small business lending markets 
have led not only to an increase in small business borrower-bank lender distance (consistent with 
contemporary studies), but also to a fundamental re-ordering of these distances by income category and 
racial class.  In particular, we focus on inter-temporal differences in SBA lending distance for low-and-
moderate income  (LMI)  areas (versus middle-and-upper income areas) and  predominantly minority 
(versus predominantly non-minority) areas.  We find that during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, lending 
distances were relatively stable, and  borrower-lender distances for  firms located in LMI and 
predominantly minority areas tended, on average, to be shorter than their counterparts in higher income 
and non-minority areas.  By the late 1990s, average lending distances had increased substantially for all 
types of small businesses, and average borrower-lender distances for loans made to firms in LMI and 
predominantly minority areas tended to be  longer than  their  respective  counterparts.  This reversal 
coincides with the increased use of SBCS as an underwriting tool, and although we cannot test this notion 
directly, we do find some corroborating evidence in the data consistent with this notion.  In the end, we 
argue that  credit scoring may  be  an important factor driving  the  increasing  distance between small 
business borrowers and their bank lenders, and if so, that this effect may be stronger for small businesses 
located in historically underserved areas.
7 
                                                             
6 Ladd (1998) reviews both the theoretical motives and empirical evidence of racial discrimination in lending. 
7 Changes made to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) may also have affected a change in borrower-lender 
distance in low-income markets.  Beginning in 1995, CRA regulations required moderate-size and large retail 
financial institutions to report the number and volume of small business loan originations in the markets from which 
they have deposit-generating branch offices (i.e., their “assessment areas”).  By making the lending patterns of 
banks more transparent—and thus, allowing inferences to be drawn about potentially discriminatory lending 
practices—these new reporting requirements may have increased the proclivity of banks to lend into low income and 
minority neighborhoods.  Indeed, according to the Federal Reserve, the share of small business loans made by 
financial institutions that were subject to the CRA  did increase, from 66 percent in 1996 to 84 percent in 2000   4
 
2.  Data 
The  primary data used in  this paper comes from the U.S. Small Business Administration’s 
(SBA’s) flagship 7(a) loan guarantee program.  This program  provides credit enhancements for small 
businesses unable to qualify for loans with similar terms in regular credit markets.  SBA-endorsed lenders 
(usually commercial banks) select the firms to receive loans, initiate the involvement of the SBA, and 
then underwrite the loans within SBA program guidelines.  The SBA extends a partial guarantee that 
absorbs some, but not all, of any loan losses on a pro rata basis.
8  As a result, lenders have (perhaps 
reduced) incentives to screen applicants for creditworthiness, monitor borrowers on an ongoing basis, and 
set appropriate loan interest rates and contract terms.  SBA guaranteed lending is a non-trivial portion of 
the bank credit provided to small business borrowers in the U.S.  In 2001, which is the most recent year in 
our data set, the SBA reported a combined managed guaranteed loan portfolio of over $50 billion.
9   
We start with a stratified random sample of 32,423 of the SBA 7(a) loans made by commercial 
banks each year between 1984 and 2001 with terms-to-maturity of 3, 7, and 15 years.
10  These loans 
represent roughly 20 percent of the guaranteed loans made each year during that time period.  We then 
eliminated all loans with incomplete or obviously erroneous information  and/or were unable to 
successfully geocode, and retained only those loans made by commercial banks, arriving at a sample of 
27,429 loans to small businesses originated between 1984 and 2001 by 5,081 different U.S. commercial 
banks.
11  Due to the growth in the SBA’s 7(a) loan guarantee program over time, our sample is weighted 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Gramlich 2002). However, because loans for which banks received CRA credit would, by definition, be located in 
these banks’ assessment areas, this regulatory change is likely to have resulted in decreased, rather than increased, 
borrower-lender distances.  
8 We emphasize that the SBA guarantee does not represent a first-dollar-loss position.  The SBA and the lender 
share proportionally the losses in the event of a default. 
9 In comparison, the portfolio of small business loans with principal less than $250,000 held by U.S. commercial 
banks in 2001 totaled about $120 billion.  (The average SBA loan originated in 2001 was about $135,000.)   
10  The SBA 7(a) program underwrites loans with terms-to-maturity from 1 to 30 years, but the large majority of 
these loans are underwritten with either 3, 7, or 15 years to maturity.  We restricted our sample to these three terms 
to more easily control for the effect of loan maturity in the analysis below. 
11 Commercial banks have historically been the primary source of credit for small businesses generally and for SBA 
guaranteed loans particularly.  However, in recent years, approximately 15 to 20 percent of SBA loans have been 
made by non-banks such as finance companies, thrifts, and credit unions.     5
toward more recent years.  Table 1 shows the annual number of loans in our sample, along with the 
aggregate and average values of these loans in both nominal and real (2001) dollars.  The average loan 
amount was relatively stable between 1984 and 1993, fluctuating between $194,000 and $225,000 in real 
dollars.  But real loan amounts began to decline on average in 1994, dropped to a sample low of $117,000 
in 1996, and rose no higher than $147,000 after that.  This reflects the 1994 introduction of a “low-doc” 
lending program for regular SBA lenders, which reduced the time needed to underwrite smaller loans 
(i.e., loans less than $100,000, raised to $150,000 in 1998) by requiring only minimal information from 
borrowers.  The timing of this reduction in loan size also roughly coincides with the introduction of small 
business credit scoring models by large commercial banks—a loan production process that typically 
generates loans that are smaller than the average small business loan (e.g., Berger and Frame, 2007).  Our 
data stops in April 2001, which accounts for the decline in the number of loans we observe in that year. 
The SBA database includes borrower-specific information, such as the physical location of the 
borrower, standard industry classification (SIC) code, corporate structure, number of employees, and the 
age of the firm.  The SBA data also identifies the name of the lender, the physical address of the office 
that wrote the loan, and the SBA lender certification type.  Finally, the SBA data includes loan-specific 
information such as the size and maturity of the credit, the SBA guarantee percentage, and whether the 
loan was originated under the SBA’s low documentation (low-doc) program.  With both borrower 
location and lender location in-hand, we  were able to  calculate the straight-line (as the crow flies) 
geographic distance between the borrower and the lender in miles (DISTANCE).   
Using the borrower location, we applied  geographic mapping software t o the data to create 
dummy variables for borrowers  located in a low- or moderate-income census tracts and for borrowers 
located in  predominantly minority census tracts.  Consistent with Community Reinvestment Act 
definitions, a low-and-moderate income census tract  (LMI)  is defined as one with median household 
income less than 80 percent of that for its metropolitan area (urban areas) or its state’s non-metropolitan 
areas (rural areas).  A predominantly minority tract (MINORITY) is defined as one in which over half of 
the residents identify themselves as part of a minority population (African-American, Hispanic, Asian,   6
Native American).  Both of these definitions are constructed for the full sample using information from 
the 2000 Census.  We use the variables LMI and MINORITY as a crude identifier of neighborhoods 
(census tracts) that have been historically underserved by financial institutions. 
The annual time series’ displayed in Figures 1 and 2 relate the median borrower-lender distances 
(DISTANCE) for loans made to borrowers in neighborhoods with different demographic characteristics.  
(The data supporting these graphs are displayed in Table 2.)  In general, the four time series’ all have 
similar shapes—relatively stable borrower-lender distances during the 1980s, small annual increases 
during the early 1990s, and larger annual increases during the later years.  This gradual  acceleration in 
borrower-lender distance  is consistent with patterns found in other studies using  both  these data 
(DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (forthcoming)) as well as data from other sources (e.g., Petersen and 
Rajan 2002).  The relative increases in borrower-lender distance by demographic groups displayed in the 
figures, however, have not been observed elsewhere.   
For example, from 1984 to 1998, the average small business borrower in a middle- or upper-
income (MUI) neighborhood was consistently located further away from the lending bank than was the 
average small business borrower in an LMI neighborhood.  (The phenomenon described here holds both 
for median averages, which are reported in Figures 1 and 2, and for mean averages, which are reported in 
Table 2.)  This relationship is consistent with the information arguments stated above.  Borrowers in low 
income neighborhoods are less likely to have strong, quantifiable documentation of their creditworthiness, 
and as such those that are able to get credit are likely to rely on close-by banks.  (Note: This is an 
especially interesting finding, given that low income and minority neighborhoods tend to be less densely 
banked to start with and hence borrowers may have fewer close-by choices.)  In contrast, borrowers in 
high income neighborhoods are more likely to have strong, quantifiable documentation of their 
creditworthiness (i.e., thick credit files), and hence can use that documentation if necessary to secure 
credit from more distant lenders.  But after 1998 this relationship reverses—the figure shows clearly that 
the median DISTANCE for LMI borrowers began increasing quickly in 1996, and that after 1998 the 
average LMI borrower  was  located significantly further away from its lender than the average MUI   7
borrower.  The data in Figure 2 show a similar juxtaposition for small business borrowers in MINORITY 
neighborhoods.  
The trends identified in Figures 1 and 2  are compelling, as they suggest that changes in the 
lending environment during the mid- and late-1990s gave small business borrowers in historically 
underserved markets access to credit from more-distant lenders—all else equal, this implies that access to 
credit in these markets increased.  However, these are univariate results that neither control for borrower 
or loan characteristics  (which likely have systematically changed over time) nor account for the high 
correlation between low-and-moderate income areas and predominantly minority areas (which in our data 
is 0.47 and statistically significant).  We consider these factors in the multivariate analysis presented in 
below Section 3.  
Before proceeding, we must acknowledge some limitations of our analysis.  First, our random 
sample of SBA loans is  unlikely to be strictly representative of population of (non-guaranteed) small 
business borrowers.  That  being  said, we note that  geographic distance confers information-gathering 
frictions on both subsidized and non-subsidized lenders alike (e.g., increased travel and monitoring costs, 
less frequent in-person contact), and these frictions are arguably  independent of  cross-sectional 
differences in risk among borrowers.  Moreover, as we discuss below, all of our regression results are 
derived after conditioning lending distance on the magnitude of the SBA loan guarantee.  Second, our 
data and methodology allow us to comment on the determinants of borrower-lender distance, whether 
these determinants are different in lower  income and minority neighborhoods, and whether these 
determinants have changed over time.  However, we cannot draw direct conclusions about cross-sectional 
and/or inter-temporal differences in credit access from our results, because we observe only loans that 
were approved by the SBA, through the lending banks, and do not observe rejected loan applications. 
Finally, we note that the SBA data have a number of advantages relative to other potential data 
sources of which we are aware.
12  The data covers a longer time period and is updated annually; it 
                                                             
12 Previous examinations of commercial lending distance have used data from either the National Survey of Small 
Business Finance (NSSBF) or the CRA public use database.  The former survey contains some limited loan-level   8
includes a variety of borrower characteristics and loan terms; and each loan can be linked to outside 
databases containing detailed information about the lender, the local market, and borrower-lender 
distance.   
 
3.  Regression Analysis 
In order to better assess the trends identified in Figures 1 and 2, we estimate several versions of 
an econometric model that evaluates the interrelationships among borrower-lender distance,  the 
demographics of local markets, and the passage of time.  The first version of our model specifies time as a 
continuous variable:   
 
     lnDISTANCEi  =  f (TIME, LMI, MINORITY,  
LMI*TIME, MINORITY*TIME, Controls)  +  ei               (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural log of (DISTANCE + 1), e is a random error term assumed to 
be symmetric with mean zero, and the subscript  i indexes loans.
13  Controls is a vector of variables 
describing borrower, lender, and loan characteristics at the time of loan origination, and is discussed in 
detail below. 
The main tests variables are LMI, MINORITY, and TIME.  LMI is a dummy variable equal to 
one for borrowers located in low- or moderate-income census tracts; about 25% of the loans in our data 
were made to such borrowers.  MINORITY is  a dummy variable equal to one when the borrower is 
located in a census tract in which over half of the population is considered to be minorities (e.g., African-
American, Hispanic, Asian); about 18% of the loans in our data were made to such borrowers.  (Note that 
LMI and  MINORITY are not mutually exclusive categories.)  Both of  these variables  appear by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
data, but the survey is not conducted every year, and lenders are not identified.  The CRA data have been collected 
annually only since 1997, and these data are aggregated for each lender at the census-tract level, rather than at the 
individual loan-level.     
13 The natural log specification recognizes the fact that the cost of traveling between two geographic points includes 
a fixed component, and as a result increases at a decreasing rate with distance (Berger and DeYoung, 2001).   9
themselves in the regressions, and are also interacted with a linear time variable TIME, where TIME = 0 
for loans originated in the first year of the sample, TIME = 1 for loans originated in the following year, 
etc.  TIME also appears by itself on the right-hand side to capture the secular increase in borrower-lender 
distance observed both in our data and in previous studies discussed above.  The coefficients on LMI and 
MINORITY allow us to test whether these borrowers were located systematically closer or further from 
their bank lenders than other SBA borrowers.  The coefficients on the interaction variables TIME*LMI 
and TIME*MINORITY allow us to test whether borrower-lender distance has increased more quickly or 
more slowly than average for these two categories of borrowers.
14      
The second version of our model specifies time as a set of discrete annual dummy variables:   
 
     lnDISTANCEi  =  f (YEAR, LMI, MINORITY,  
LMI*YEAR, MINORITY*YEAR, Controls)  +  ei               (2) 
 
where  YEAR is a vector of dummy variables representing each year in the analysis.
15  This  discrete 
specification of time is more flexible than its continuous time counterpart in equation (1), as it allows the 
estimated associations between distance and market demographics (LMI, MINORITY) to vary each year.  
The third and final version of our model specifies TIME in two discrete segments based on the 
patterns observed in Figures 1 and 2 .  We model the apparent  structural change in borrower-lender 
distance using a dummy variable D9601 that is equal to one for loans originated in 1996 or later:   
 
     lnDISTANCEi  =  f (D9601, LMI, MINORITY,  
LMI*D9601, MINORITY*D9601, Controls)  +  ei               (3) 
 
                                                             
14 Introducing time as a stand-alone variable, and indirectly by interacting time with other key variables, is a method 
commonly used in the literature to capture the latent effects of technological changes. 
15 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.   10
The interaction of D9601 with the LMI and Minority variables  is meant to capture  the  apparent 
acceleration in distance for these borrowers during the late-1990s and early 2000s.  Table 3 displays 
summary statistics for all of the regression variables.  (Information on the YEAR and D9601 dummy 
variables can be gleaned from Table 2.)  
We estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques 
and a 1992-2001 data sub-sample.  Although we observe SBA loans originations in different years, we do 
not follow any of these loans through time, and as such our data is cross sectional  rather than a panel.  
Although we have data on SBA loans originated as far back beginning in 1984, we use the shorter ten-
year time segment in our estimations for two reasons.  First, the data in Figures 1 and 2 suggest a very 
stable relationship between borrower-lender distance, time, and demographic groups during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Because we are testing for changes in these relationships, we accomplish little by including 
loans originated in these earlier years in our regression tests.  Second, since the structural underpinnings 
of the banking industry (i.e., regulations, production processes, degree of competition) have been in flux 
throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, using a shorter data window minimizes the impact of these 
changes on our estimated regression coefficients.
16   
The coefficients on the LMI and MINORITY variables could theoretically be either positive or 
negative, depending on the relative strength of two non-mutually exclusive phenomena.  On one hand, 
low income and minority census tracts are likely to be less densely banked or branched—that is, they are 
underserved markets—which would require borrowers to go further to find a lender, ceteris paribus.  One 
might call this the “access to lenders effect.”  On the other hand, borrowers in low i ncome or minority 
census tract are less likely to have fully documented financial histories, which would preclude them from 
getting loans at banks too distant to observe the soft information necessary to underwrite and monitor 
these loans.  One might call  this the “soft information effect.”  The estimated coefficients on LMI and 
                                                             
16 We did estimate all three regression equations using the full 1984-2001 data sample (results not shown here, 
available from the authors upon request).  We found no substantial differences in results for equations (2) or (3).  
We found somewhat weaker results for equation (1), because using the 1984-2001 data spreads out the estimated 
impact of LMI*TIME and MINORITY*TIME over a longer number of years.    11
MINORITY will be the net of these two effects.  Furthermore, the weights of these two phenomena are 
likely to have changed during our sample period in the direction of greater borrower-lender distance.  
Innovations in information gathering, communications, and financial technologies have allowed lenders 
to “harden”  soft information  about borrower creditworthiness (e.g.,  credit scoring) as well as better 
mitigate the risk associated w ith these loans (e.g., larger and more diversified portfolios, loan 
securitization, credit derivatives).  This likely increased the ability of more distant banks to profitably 
lend  to small business borrowers, and especially to small business borrowers located in  historically 
underserved markets.  Thus, we expect  a positive coefficient on the TIME variable (as well as on its 
counterpart variables in specifications (2) and (3)), and we also expect a positive coefficient on the 
interaction variables LMI*TIME and MINORITY*TIME (as well as on their counterpart variables in 
specifications (2) and (3)).   
3.1 Control variables   
We include five variables to control for borrower characteristics that might impact commercial 
lending distances.  Our proxy for the size of the borrowing firm, EMPLOYMENT, is the number of full-
time equivalent workers employed by the borrowing firm at origination.  The typical borrower had about 
12 employees.
17  Because this variable is highly skewed, we specify it in natural logs.  CORPORATION 
and PARTNERSHIP are dummy variables  equal to one, respectively, for  borrowers organized as 
corporations (about 58% of the borrowers) and partnerships (about 6% of the borrowers).  The omitted 
category is sole proprietorship.  NEW BUSINESS is a dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is 
less than three years old; these young firms comprise about one-third of the loans in our sample.  SIC is a 
vector of dummy variables indicating whether the borrower’s main line-of-business falls within one of 
several especially well-populated Standard Industrial Classifications.  
                                                             
17 A small number of borrowers (15) in our data reported greater than 500 employees, which is the traditional upper 
bound for the SBA definition of a small business.  Removing these outlying observations from our regressions does 
not alter our results.    12
We include four variables to control for loan characteristics.
18  MATURITY3 and MATURITY7 
are dummy variables equal to one, respectively, if the loan has a maturity of 3 years or 7 years.  These 
loans account for over 80% of the loans in the data.  The omitted loan maturity is the 15-year loan.
19  
LOWDOC is a dummy variable equal to one for loans underwritten using the SBA’s “low 
documentation” option that started in 1994 to reduce paperwork for loans less than $100,000; about 40% 
of the loans are low-doc loans.  The SBA guarantee percentage, GUAR%, is the percentage of the dollar 
loss that the lender can put back to the SBA in the event of default; the mean loan guarantee was about 80 
percent, but ranged from as low as 11 percent to as high as 90 percent.  Over time, SBA loan guarantees 
have (a) declined on average and (b) exhibited increased variation across loans (DeYoung, Glennon, and 
Nigro (forthcoming)).  We include this variable to control for the possibility that banks may lend at longer 
distances—that is, take more distance-related risk—for loans with higher amounts of default protection.
20    
We include two variables to control for lender characteristics.  PLP LENDER and CLP LENDER 
are dummy variables equal to one if the lender is a “preferred loan provider” (15% of the sample loans) or 
a “certified loan provider” (13% of the sample loans).  These lenders are experienced SBA lenders with 
good track records, and being recognized as such reduces their administrative burden.  PLP lenders have 
the least restrictive SBA documentation requirements; in exchange for these reduced administrative costs, 
however, their loan guarantee percentages are capped at a lower amount.  The omitted category, which 
comprises all other lenders with SBA certification are called “regular” lenders.  
 
4.  Results 
                                                             
18 We also ran regressions that included the natural log of loan size (in dollars) as an additional control variable.  
The relationship between loan size and borrower-lender distance tended to be significant and positive, and including 
this variable had no effect on the remainder of the coefficient estimates.    
19  The 15-year loans are typically collateralized by real estate. The SBA also markets products with maturities other 
than 3-, 7-, and 15-years, such as lines of credit, but loans with these three maturities represent the most substantial 
part of the SBA portfolio.   
20 We do not control for loan size in the regressions reported here: If credit scoring is responsible for the observed 
changes in borrower-lender distance, then longer distance loans will likely be smaller loans—that is, loan size would 
be an endogenous variable.  However, we have included loan size in other versions of these regressions (results not 
reported here, available upon request) and the main results for LMI, MINORITY, and TIME are not materially 
affected.     13
The regression estimates for equation (1), in which TIME is modeled as a continuous variable, 
are displayed in Table 4.  The parameter estimates largely confirm our visual impressions from Figures 1 
and 2.    First, the estimated coefficients on the TIME variable are always positive and statistically 
significant, consistent with the general upward sloping trends in the figures, and confirming the stylized 
fact that borrower-lender distances have been increasing over time, on average.     
Second, the coefficient on LMI is negative and significant, consistent with the “soft information 
effect” that information problems require borrowers in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods to be 
closer to their bank lenders.  The magnitude of this effect is  substantial and  quite stable across 
regressions.  Based on the estimates from the full specification in column [6], at the beginning of the 
1992-2001 sample period (i.e., setting TIME = 0) the average small business borrower in an LMI 
neighborhood was located approximately 31% closer to its lender than was the average small business 
borrower in a middle- or upper-income (MUI) neighborhood.
21  The coefficient on MINORITY also tends 
to be negative and significant, but only in specifications that exclude the LMI variable.  For example, 
based on the column [5] estimates, the average small business borrower in a MINORITY neighborhood 
was located approximately 18% closer to its lender than was the average small business borrower in a 
non-MINORITY neighborhood.  However, this effect disappears when both MINORITY and LMI are 
included in the regression, suggesting that the soft information problems associated with low income 
neighborhoods may dominate the soft information problems associated with minority neighborhoods. 
We know that many low income neighborhoods are also predominantly minority neighborhoods, 
so it is possible that colinearity between LMI and MINORITY is reducing the efficiency of our estimates.  
Indeed,  the linear correlation between LMI and MINORITY is 0.47 in our data.  We ran  standard 
colinearity (variance inflation) diagnostic tests, but these tests rejected colinearity in all of the regressions 
in which both LMI and MINORITY were present (including those in Tables 4, 5, and 6).
22  We also 
attempted to disentangle the effects of these variables by running regressions that included the interaction 
                                                             
21  Setting TIME = 0, the calculation is performed as follows:  exp(-0.379) = 0.685, or an approximate reduction in 
distance of about 31%.   
22 The Condition Index never exceeded a value of 16, well below the critical level of 30 typically used in such tests.    14
term LMI*MINORITY on the right-hand side, but the coefficients on the interaction terms were seldom 
statistically different from zero in these regressions.  Unable to establish separate estimates of the impact 
of LMI and MINORITY on borrower-lender distance, we performed statistical tests to establish the joint 
significance of LMI and MINORITY (and also the joint significance of LMI*TIME and 
MINORITY*TIME).  Essentially, this provides a test of whether borrower-lender distances are 
significantly different for core underserved neighborhoods, i.e., the combined effect of both minority and 
low income populations.  For example, in some regressions we cannot reject the individual nulls for both 
LMI and MINORITY (or for both LMI*TIME and MINORITY*TIME), but we can reject the null  of 
joint significance (see Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 below).  In Table 4, we reject the null for joint significance in 
columns [3] and [6], even where one or the other of these two demographic variables is statistically non-
significant by itself. 
Third, as time passes in our data set, the differential in borrower-lender distances between the 
average small business borrower versus small business borrowers in LMI and MINORITY neighborhoods 
tends to diminish.  Again, based on the estimates in the column [6] regression, borrower-lender distance 
increased faster for borrowers in LMI areas (about 11% per year) than for borrowers in MUI areas (about 
8% per year).
23  Similarly, borrower-lender distance increased faster for borrowers in MINORITY 
neighborhoods (about 12% per year) than for borrowers in non-MINORITY neighborhoods (also about 
8% per year).          
The regression estimates for equation (2), in which time is modeled as a set of discrete YEAR 
variables, are displayed in Table 5.  While this specification is potentially more flexible than equation (1), 
the adjusted-R-square measures are improved only at the third decimal place: Comparing the column [6] 
regressions, adjusted-R-square is 0.1157 in Table 4 versus 0.1170 in Table 5.  Several of the main results 
                                                             
23 Our model has the form ln(distance) = a + bx, which we can re-write as 
bx a bx a e e e y = =
+ .  The relative change 
in distance is defined as 
0
1









- = - .  Setting LMI = 1 and recognizing that the mean of TIME is 4.59, 
the first calculation is performed as follows:  [exp(.032*5.59)exp(.075*5.59)] / [exp(.032*4.59)exp(.075*4.59)] = 
1.113, or an approximate increase in distance of 11%.  Setting LMI = 0, the second calculation is performed as 
follows:  exp(.075*5.59) / exp(.075*4.59) = 1.078, or an approximate increase in distance of 8%.       15
continue to hold, including (a) the general increase in borrower-lender distance over time, as evidenced 
by the increasingly positive coefficients on the YEAR dummies, (b) support for the soft information 
effect, as evidenced in the significant negative coefficient on the LMI variable (in contrast, the coefficient 
on MINORITY is never statistically significant here), and (c) an above-average increase in borrower-
lender distance near the end of the sample period for borrowers in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficients on LMI*YEAR00, LMI*YEAR01, 
MINORITY*YEAR00, and MINORITY*YEAR01.  This last finding either diminishes or  disappears 
completely  when both the LMI and MINORITY variables appear on the right-hand side—however, 
LMI*YEAR00 and MINORITY*YEAR00 do remain jointly significant.   Importantly, although the 
coefficients on the LMI*YEAR and MINORITY*YEAR variables are seldom statistically significant in 
Table 5, these coefficients are always positive after 1996.       
 The regression estimates for equation (3), in which time is modeled in two discrete segments 
based on the convex shapes observed in Figures 1 and 2, are displayed in Table 5.   Although this 
specification provides the lowest goodness-of-fit statistics of the three models, grouping the post-1996 
time effects together (as opposed to specifying them individually as in equation (2)) generates statistically 
significant inter-temporal results.  The coefficients on LMI*D9601 and MINORITY*D9601 are always 
statistically significant, both individually and jointly, in these regressions—further evidence consistent 
with our initial observation that small business borrower-lender distances accelerated faster than average 
in low income and minority neighborhoods late in our sample period.    
The estimated coefficients on t he control variables are generally statistically significant, 
remarkably stable across Tables 4, 5, and 6 , and tend to carry sensible signs.
24  The goodness-of-fit 
                                                             
24 We do not discuss the signs and significance of coefficients on the individual control variables here, as they are 
not the main focus of our study.  For an in-depth discussion of the determinants of small business borrower-bank 
lender distance, see DeYoung, Frame, Glennon, and Nigro (2006).  However, we do point the reader’s attention to 
the negative coefficient on GUAR%, which is contrary to our expectation that higher levels of credit protection 
would incent bank lenders to take on additional distance-related risk.  We further investigated this by including the 
interaction term GUAR%*LOWDOC on the right-hand side of our regressions (results not shown, available upon 
request from authors).  The coefficient on GUAR% remained negative, but the coefficient on GUAR%*LOWDOC 
was positive and substantially larger in absolute value.  Hence, for the most information-deficient loan applications   16
statistic nearly doubled with the addition of the control variables, indicating that a non-trivial amount of 
the variation in borrower-lender distance is attributable to the characteristics of the borrower, the lender, 
and the loan.  Introducing or removing the control variables from the regressions has very little influence 
on the estimates for LMI, LMI*TIME, or MINORITY (for example, compare columns [3] and [6] in 
Table 4), although adding the control variables to the regressions caused non-trivial reductions in the 
magnitudes of the coefficients on TIME and MINORITY*TIME.   
The distribution of o ur raw dependent variable DISTANCE is skewed to the right.
25  While 
rescaling DISTANCE in natural logs mitigates this problem to some extent, it remains possible that the 
estimated association between our main test variables and borrower-lender distance is overstated in our 
regressions.  To test for this, we re-estimated the column [6] regressions from Tables 4, 5, and 6 after 
truncating DISTANCE at both the 99
th percentile (1,445 miles) and the 95
th percentile (312 miles) of its 
sample distribution.  The results of these robustness tests are displayed in Table 7, and they indicate little 
effect on our results.  The signs and statistical significance of our main test coefficients are invariant to 
this truncation, although in a few instances the magnitudes of the coefficients are somewhat smaller.     
Mean and median distances notably increased in the final year of our sample, which contains data 
only for January through April.  This raises the question of whether these 2001 observations reflect a 
secular increase in distance, or perhaps are driven simply by seasonality.
26  To test for this, we re-
estimated the column [6] regressions from Tables 4, 5, and 6 without the loans originated in 2001.  The 
results of this robustness test can be found in Table 8 and suggest that this data exclusion had no material 
affect on our estimates.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(i.e., low documentation loans), lending banks with higher levels of credit protection were more likely to take on 
additional distance-related risk.        
25 For our 1992-2001 sample period, DISTANCE = 10 miles at the median of the data, DISTANCE = 30 miles at the 
75
th percentile of the data, and DISTANCE = 77 miles at the mean of the data.  
26 We note that, for each year between 1990 and 2000, the average value of DISTANCE for loans made in January 
through April was exceeded by the average value of DISTANCE for loans made May through December.   17
Finally, having confirmed in a more rigorous fashion the inter-temporal relationships displayed in 
Figures 1 and 2, we are left with an important question:  What environmental changes are responsible for 
the intriguing re-ordering of borrower-lender distance in those figures?   
One possibility is that the consolidation of the banking industry consolidation during the sample 
period resulted in fewer bank branches in LMI and MINORITY areas—which would require borrowers 
located in these areas to have to travel further on average to find lenders.  To investigate this issue, we 
examined the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits data for 1994 and 2001.
27  We find that the mean number of 
bank branches in LMI (non-LMI) census tracts increased from 7.77 (6.91) in 1994 to 7.95 (7.39) in 2001.  
For MINORITY (non-MINORITY) census tracts, the mean number of branches rose from 8.06 (6.93) in 
1994 to 8.23 (7.39) in 2001.  Given that the number of branches increased on average in all types of 
neighborhoods during the sample period, our results are unlikely to be driven by a systematic reduction in 
access to banking offices in historically underserved areas. 
The more likely candidate for the re-ordering of borrower-lender distance is small business credit 
scoring.  We know that the SBCS loan production function is applied most often to smaller loans—so 
called “micro-small business loans” less than $100,000—with more traditional relationship-based, soft-
information underwriting techniques applied to larger loans.  Hence, we re-estimated the column [6] 
regressions from Tables 4, 5, and 6 for three data sub-samples: micro-small business loans with principals 
amounts less than $100,000;  loans with principals between $100,000 and $250,000; and l oans with 
principal amounts greater than $250,000.
28   
The results are displayed in Table 9.  First, the  speed at which general (i.e., non-LMI, non-
MINIORITY) borrower-lender distance increases over time actually accelerates with loan size; this can 
be seen by comparing the coefficients on TIME, the YEAR dummies, and the D9601 variable across the 
columns in Table 9.  If credit scoring is indeed used primarily for micro-small business loans only, then 
this  result suggests that some phenomena  other than  credit scoring is  responsible for the  increasing 
                                                             
27 The 1994 data represents the first time that the Summary of Deposits information is available from the FDIC in 
electronic form. 
28 Since we are segmenting the data by loan size, we exclude the LOWDOC control variable from these regressions.   18
borrower-lender distances for large loans in non-minority, non-LMI neighborhoods.  Second, borrower-
lender distance for loans in predominantly minority neighborhoods  increase faster-than-average for the 
small loan sub-sample, but  not for  the  large loan sub-sample; this can be seen by comparing the 
coefficients on the MINORITY*TIME and MINORITY*D9601 variables across the columns in Table 9.  
Related to this result, the additional increase in distance over time for LMI and MINORITY tends to be 
jointly significant for the smallest loans, but not for the largest loans.  Hence, we find weak but suggestive 
evidence that credit scoring may be playing a part in the shifting distribution of small business borrower-
bank lender distance, and if so, this effect is somewhat stronger for small businesses located in 
historically underserved areas. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Public policies have been adopted in the United States that encourage greater extension of credit 
to small firms, especially to those located in lower-income and predominantly minority areas.  These 
policies are based  in part on several  perceptions:  that informational frictions  in small business credit 
markets discourage  lenders from exploiting  profitable lending opportunities; that large banking 
companies that command the lion’s share of loanable bank funds are especially poorly equipped to serve 
this market; and that, because information on small business creditworthiness is costly to produce, some 
lenders may rely on  the  demographic characteristics of  business owners and their neighborhoods as 
proxies  for loan profitability.  But r ecent research  suggests that  conditions in  small business credit 
markets are changing—so depending on the impact of these changes, public policy toward lending into 
these markets may have to be reconsidered.  This study examines whether and how the distance between 
small business borrowers and their banks lenders has changed over the past decade, and uses the results to 
make some tentative inferences about the impact of forces of change in this sector. 
To date, s tudies have found modest increases in the distance between U.S. small business 
borrowers and their lenders, which suggests (among other things) that the average small business 
borrower is gaining access to a greater number of lenders.  In this paper, we reexamine this phenomenon   19
using a large random sample of SBA-guaranteed loans originated between 1984 and 2001, giving special 
attention to SBA borrowers in low income and minority neighborhoods.  After confirming that lending 
distances have also increased in recent years for the loans in our data, we demonstrate further that the 
observed  patterns in borrower-lender distance  depend crucially on the demographic make-up  of the 
lending area.  We find that, during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, lending distances were relatively 
stable and that loans made to firms located in lower-income and predominantly minority areas tended to 
have slightly shorter distances.  During the late 1990s, however, lending distances increased markedly, 
and by 1999 firms located in low-income and minority areas tended to have substantially longer lending 
distances.   
This  general acceleration in small business borrower-bank lender distances, as well as the re-
ordering of borrower-lender distances across demographic areas that accompanied it, occurred 
coincidently with the implementation of small business credit scoring (SBCS) models.  We find weak but 
suggestive evidence in our data linking the above-average increases in lending distances for borrowers in 
low income and minority neighborhoods to the implementation of SBCS models.  These findings should 
allay  fears that  the growth of  transactions-based lending processes—which make arms-length  credit 
decisions based on hard information,  rather than bankers’ personal information about individual 
borrowers and local markets—will lead to reduced credit availability in already underserved markets.  On 
the contrary, our findings of longer borrower-lender distances are consistent with increased competition to 
lend to these small businesses.              20
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 Average and Total Loan Amounts by Disbursement Year 
 
Disbursement Total  Average Loan Amount  Disbursement 
Year 
Number of 
Loans  Nominal $  2001 $  Nominal $  2001 $ 
1984  628  $99,567,336  $141,564,932  $158,546.71  $225,421.86 
1985  442  $66,902,953  $92,834,809  $151,364.15  $210,033.51 
1986  704  $112,574,917  $152,678,460  $159,907.55  $216,872.81 
1987  690  $113,965,327  $150,880,838  $165,167.14  $218,667.88 
1988  639  $107,014,706  $137,198,342  $167,472.15  $214,707.88 
1989  771  $127,558,147  $156,705,340  $165,445.07  $203,249.47 
1990  812  $135,671,710  $160,748,471  $167,083.39  $197,966.10 
1991  894  $152,029,280  $173,946,544  $170,055.12  $194,571.08 
1992  1087  $196,067,418  $219,151,361  $180,374.81  $201,611.19 
1993  1341  $257,520,901  $284,448,713  $192,036.47  $212,116.87 
1994  2144  $344,166,759  $376,550,065  $160,525.54  $175,629.69 
1995  3785  $427,299,993  $457,821,421  $112,893.00  $120,956.79 
1996  2305  $256,830,476  $271,299,798  $111,423.20  $117,700.56 
1997  2801  $356,493,898  $375,520,258  $127,273.79  $134,066.49 
1998  2619  $369,808,281  $386,021,170  $141,202.09  $147,392.58 
1999  2507  $336,948,326  $345,942,839  $134,403.00  $137,990.76 
2000  2462  $350,162,199  $354,894,120  $142,226.73  $144,148.71 
2001  798  $108,390,580  $108,390,580  $135,827.79  $135,827.79 
 
Note:  Conversion to real 2001 dollars was performed using the Producer Price Index for finished goods 
excluding food and energy.   
Note:  The substantial decline in the number of loans in 2001 reflects the fact that our sampling ended in 
April 2001.    24
Table 2 
Panel A. Mean and Median Distance by Income Category 
 
Medium- and Upper-Income 
Census Tracts  
Low- and Moderate-Income 














1984  453  32.90316  6.509887  175  15.49214  4.521385 
1985  301  30.33144  5.997078  141  16.92694  5.137181 
1986  517  18.12122  5.900665  187  10.82696  4.194113 
1987  496  22.10763  6.793952  194  18.17069  3.923864 
1988  447  15.60593  6.528291  192  10.81585  3.911706 
1989  562  16.0087  7.274158  209  13.74822  4.844745 
1990  571  25.65258  6.485765  241  17.88411  4.159116 
1991  635  26.19148  8.205989  259  13.26557  5.096839 
1992  797  20.57438  7.232289  290  21.31918  5.280787 
1993  972  19.50277  7.685576  369  18.59559  5.427067 
1994  1569  21.98141  8.264455  575  24.62733  6.710005 
1995  2829  27.87952  8.886615  956  27.81215  5.681283 
1996  1783  31.05839  9.805071  522  28.39449  5.93394 
1997  2090  46.02044  11.53342  711  48.02328  8.497415 
1998  1984  125.176  13.59954  635  117.9785  11.69613 
1999  1870  146.9941  17.24617  637  152.5251  17.27472 
2000  1849  157.2507  16.05324  613  206.8757  23.16412 
2001  569  205.6401  17.64122  229  233.5038  33.7539 
Panel B. Mean and Median Distance by Racial Category 














1984  529  30.04924  5.857058  99  17.37582  5.080296 
1985  352  28.8849  5.819115  90  14.98862  5.595425 
1986  582  17.46906  5.682479  122  10.0518  4.645927 
1987  594  21.10335  5.597175  96  20.36567  5.193252 
1988  538  15.06176  5.925328  101  9.398685  4.493974 
1989  660  15.52521  6.522579  111  14.62728  4.37719 
1990  673  23.00228  5.918475  139  25.01554  5.986342 
1991  741  24.55505  7.4371  153  12.23583  5.625274 
1992  901  20.33494  6.804592  186  22.8955  6.158276 
1993  1101  19.98942  7.248644  240  15.87545  6.258402 
1994  1756  22.46549  7.887899  388  23.7117  7.665068 
1995  3099  27.6504  8.634888  686  28.82067  6.257397 
1996  1953  29.06249  9.241861  352  38.18179  7.239817 
1997  2324  44.31385  10.96619  477  57.3205  9.873879 
1998  2136  120.4919  12.64448  483  136.428  14.29302 
1999  2039  141.81  16.94704  468  177.109  19.8542 
2000  1999  150.7424  15.87875  463  251.0526  23.99302 
2001  658  188.6493  17.90484  140  331.074  44.70016 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics, sub-sample (1992-2001).  Data for 21,849 small business loans originated by U.S. 
commercial banks under the Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) loan program.  
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
DISTANCE  77.1839  321.9710  0.1000  7882.6000 
ln(DISTANCE)  2.3943  1.9050  -2.3026  8.9724 
Time  4.5929  2.4330  0  9 
LMI  0.2534  0.4350  0  1 
Minority  0.1777  0.3823  0  1 
Employment  12.71  118.03??  1  9,999
29 
Corporation  0.5791  0.4937  0  1 
Partnership  0.0629  0.2428  0  1 
New Business  0.3338  0.4716  0  1 
sic_A  0.0295  0.1693  0  1 
sic_B  0.0025  0.0501  0  1 
sic_C  0.0534  0.2248  0  1 
sic_D  0.1174  0.3219  0  1 
sic_E  0.0363  0.1870  0  1 
sic_F  0.0783  0.2686  0  1 
sic_G  0.3237  0.4679  0  1 
sic_H  0.0145  0.1194  0  1 
sic_I  0.3124  0.4635  0  1 
Loan Size   $142,877  164,446  2,000  2,550,000 
Maturity3  0.1551  0.3620  0  1 
Maturity7  0.6627  0.4728  0  1 
Low Doc  0.3946  0.4888  0  1 
Guarantee %  0.7853  0.1037  0.1100  0.9000 
PLP Lender  0.1504  0.3575  0  1 
CLP Lender  0.1299  0.3362  0  1 
 
Selected sample statistics for 21,630 small business loans, after omitting loans with DISTANCE > 99
th 
percentile of the sample distribution (i.e., 1,444 miles).     
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
ln(DISTANCE)  2.3404  1.8369  -2.3026  7.2755 
DISTANCE  52.5623  146.5302  0.1000  1444.5400 
LMI  0.2533  0.4349  0  1 
Minority  0.1769  0.3816  0  1 
Time  4.5657  2.4267  0  9 
 
                                                             
29 There are 15 loans made to firms with greater than 500 employees, including one loan for $2.5 million to a firm 
that reported 9,999 employees.  SBA loans to firms with more than 500 employees are made only under unusual 
circumstances.  These loans will be omitted from our tests in the next draft of the paper.    26
Table 4 – Continuous Time Specification  
Regression results for equation (1), estimated coefficients and standard errors.  21,849 SBA loans 
originated between 1992 and 2001.  Dependent variable is ln(DISTANCE).  ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
  
  [1]  [2]  [3] 
Intercept  1.627**  0.031  1.575**  0.029  1.636**  0.032 
Time  0.175**  0.006  0.174**  0.006  0.169**  0.006 
LMI   -0.388**  0.061      -0.358**  0.068 
LMI*Time  0.055**  0.012      0.029*  0.013 
Minority      -0.279**  0.070  -0.089  0.078 
Minority*Time      0.083**  0.013  0.068**  0.015 
             
F(LMI,Minority)  --    --    21.65**   
F(LMI*Time, Minority*Time)  --    --    21.64**   
Adjusted-R2  0.0602    0.0605    0.0627   
 
  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Intercept  4.966**  0.163  4.889**  0.163  4.945**  0.163 
Time  0.077**  0.007  0.080**  0.007  0.075**  0.007 
LMI   -0.379**  0.059      -0.379**  0.066 
LMI*Time  0.047**  0.011      0.032*  0.013 
Minority      -0.205**  0.068  -0.006  0.076 
Minority*Time      0.055**  0.013  0.038**  0.015 
Ln(Employment)  -0.050**  0.013  -0.054**  0.013  -0.050**  0.013 
Corporation  0.023  0.028  0.024  0.028  0.025  0.028 
Partnership  0.015  0.053  0.020  0.053  0.019  0.053 
New Business  0.071**  0.028  0.080**  0.028  0.074**  0.028 
SIC_A  0.028  0.101  0.059  0.101  0.037  0.101 
SIC_B  -0.134  0.252  -0.106  0.253  -0.117  0.252 
SIC_C  -0.264**  0.089  -0.252**  0.089  -0.257**  0.089 
SIC_D  -0.251**  0.080  -0.250**  0.080  -0.251**  0.080 
SIC_E  -0.154  0.096  -0.152  0.096  -0.154  0.096 
SIC_F  -0.288**  0.084  -0.298**  0.084  -0.294**  0.084 
SIC_G  -0.370**  0.075  -0.361**  0.075  -0.365**  0.075 
SIC_H  -0.326**  0.124  -0.328**  0.124  -0.333**  0.124 
SIC_I  -0.279**  0.075  -0.270**  0.075  -0.276**  0.075 
Maturity3  0.104*  0.044  0.096*  0.044  0.093*  0.044 
Maturity7  0.126**  0.033  0.122**  0.033  0.121**  0.033 
Low Doc   -0.189**  0.034  -0.182**  0.034  -0.185**  0.034 
Guarantee %  -3.445**  0.166  -3.430**  0.166  -3.422**  0.166 
PLP Lender  0.644**  0.039  0.639**  0.039  0.639**  0.039 
CLP Lender  0.183**  0.041  0.183**  0.041  0.185**  0.041 
             
F(LMI,Minority)  --    --    20.84**   
F(LMI*Time, Minority*Time)  --    --    11.88**   
Adjusted-R2  0.1146    0.1133    0.1157   
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Table 5 – Discrete Time Specification 
Regression results for equation (2), estimated coefficients and standard errors.  21,849 SBA loans 
originated between 1992 and 2001.  Dependent variable is ln(DISTANCE).  ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
 
  [1]  [2]  [3] 
             




Intercept  1.859**  0.065  1.793**  0.061  1.848**  0.066   
d1993  0.069  0.088  0.091  0.083  0.082  0.089   
d1994  0.121  0.080  0.134  0.076  0.120  0.082   
d1995  0.222**  0.074  0.246**  0.070  0.240**  0.075   
d1996  0.323**  0.079  0.308**  0.074  0.322**  0.080   
d1997  0.514**  0.077  0.536**  0.072  0.511**  0.078   
d1998  0.869**  0.077  0.866**  0.073  0.843**  0.079   
d1999  1.116**  0.078  1.145**  0.074  1.108**  0.079   
d2000  1.175**  0.078  1.176**  0.074  1.135**  0.080   
d2001  1.406**  0.101  1.433**  0.094  1.386**  0.103   
LMI  -0.242*  0.126      -0.289*  0.137  2.22 
LMI93  -0.018  0.169      0.035  0.188  0.25 
LMI94  0.075  0.155      0.058  0.170  0.10 
LMI95  -0.106  0.144      -0.024  0.158  0.99 
LMI96  -0.162  0.156      -0.196  0.172  0.67 
LMI97  0.152  0.150      0.101  0.165  0.50 
LMI98  0.220  0.152      0.085  0.167  2.05 
LMI99  0.234  0.152      0.182  0.167  1.16 
LMI00  0.382**  0.153      0.210  0.167  5.21** 
LMI01  0.381*  0.192      0.251  0.212  2.72 
Minority      0.007  0.148  0.141  0.161   
minority93      -0.162  0.198  -0.154  0.220   
minority94      0.036  0.181  0.022  0.198   
minority95      -0.260  0.168  -0.223  0.184   
minority96      -0.078  0.183  0.057  0.202   
minority97      0.114  0.175  0.088  0.193   
minority98      0.333  0.175  0.302  0.192   
minority99      0.178  0.176  0.100  0.193   
minority00      0.522**  0.176  0.426*  0.192   
minority01      0.442*  0.227  0.329  0.251   
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Table 5 – Discrete Time Specification (continued) 
  [4]  [5]  [6] 
             
F-test of joint significance with 
similar Minority variable 
Intercept  5.105**  0.174  5.026**  0.173  5.065**  0.174   
d1993  0.075  0.086  0.085  0.081  0.080  0.087   
d1994  0.150  0.078  0.146*  0.074  0.139  0.080   
d1995  0.440**  0.074  0.443**  0.071  0.449**  0.076   
d1996  0.234**  0.081  0.210**  0.077  0.232**  0.082   
d1997  0.306**  0.079  0.324**  0.075  0.308**  0.081   
d1998  0.501**  0.080  0.501**  0.076  0.481**  0.082   
d1999  0.599**  0.082  0.637**  0.078  0.601**  0.083   
d2000  0.638**  0.082  0.643**  0.079  0.612**  0.084   
d2001  0.664**  0.114  0.696**  0.109  0.665**  0.115   
lmi  -0.241*  0.123      -0.272*  0.134  2.09 
lmi93  -0.012  0.165      0.007  0.183  0.05 
lmi94  0.091  0.151      0.031  0.166  0.39 
lmi95  -0.122  0.140      -0.072  0.154  0.69 
lmi96  -0.178  0.152      -0.209  0.168  0.81 
lmi97  0.093  0.145      0.082  0.161  0.16 
lmi98  0.198  0.148      0.092  0.162  1.55 
lmi99  0.220  0.148      0.205  0.163  1.02 
lmi00  0.304*  0.149      0.175  0.162  3.31* 
lmi01  0.265  0.187      0.186  0.206  1.31 
Minority      -0.026  0.144  0.098  0.157   
minority93      -0.087  0.193  -0.066  0.214   
minority94      0.137  0.176  0.138  0.193   
minority95      -0.202  0.163  -0.141  0.179   
minority96      -0.084  0.178  0.057  0.196   
minority97      0.021  0.170  0.003  0.188   
minority98      0.276  0.170  0.240  0.187   
minority99      0.107  0.171  0.016  0.188   
minority00      0.398*  0.172  0.318  0.187   
minority01      0.282  0.221  0.203  0.244   
Ln(Employment)  -0.050**  0.013  -0.054**  0.013  -0.050**  0.013   
Corporation  0.020  0.028  0.020  0.028  0.022  0.028   
Partnership  0.015  0.053  0.020  0.053  0.019  0.053   
New Business  0.079**  0.028  0.088**  0.028  0.082**  0.028   
SIC_A  0.006  0.116  0.044  0.116  0.026  0.116   
SIC_B  -0.130  0.259  -0.100  0.259  -0.106  0.259   
SIC_C  -0.284**  0.105  -0.264*  0.105  -0.266*  0.105   
SIC_D  -0.271**  0.098  -0.260**  0.098  -0.259**  0.098   
SIC_E  -0.176  0.111  -0.166  0.111  -0.165  0.111   
SIC_F  -0.310**  0.101  -0.309**  0.101  -0.303**  0.101   
SIC_G  -0.384**  0.094  -0.366**  0.094  -0.366**  0.094   
SIC_H  -0.345*  0.136  -0.344*  0.136  -0.339**  0.136   
SIC_I  -0.298**  0.094  -0.279**  0.094  -0.282**  0.094   
Maturity3  0.091*  0.044  0.080  0.044  0.079  0.044   
Maturity7  0.128**  0.033  0.123**  0.033  0.123**  0.033   
Low Doc   -0.171**  0.037  -0.165**  0.037  -0.167**  0.037   
Guarantee %  -3.653**  0.172  -3.635**  0.172  -3.630**  0.172   
PLP Lender  0.662**  0.040  0.658**  0.040  0.658**  0.040   
CLP Lender  0.197**  0.041  0.194**  0.041  0.198**  0.041   
Adjusted-R2  0.1167    0.1156    0.1170     
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Table 6 – Structural Change Specification 
Regression results for equation (3), coefficients and standard errors.  21,849 SBA loans originated 
between 1992 and 2001. Dependent variable is ln(DISTANCE).  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% 
and 5% levels. 
 
  [1]  [2]  [3] 
Intercept  2.003**  0.024  1.953**  0.023  2.001**  0.024 
D9601  0.687**  0.030  0.679**  0.029  0.661**  0.031 
LMI   -0.275**  0.046      -0.285**  0.052 
LMI* D9601  0.239**  0.060      0.096  0.067 
Minority      -0.126*  0.053  0.024  0.060 
Minority* D9601      0.401**  0.068  0.349**  0.077 
             
F(LMI, Minority)  --    --    17.61**   
F(LMI*Time, MIN*Time)  --    --    3.73**   
Adjusted-R2  0.0381    0.0387    0.0408   
 
  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Intercept  5.976**  0.147  5.906**  0.147  5.953**  0.147 
D9601  0.129**  0.036  0.138**  0.034  0.119**  0.036 
LMI   -0.278**  0.045      -0.303**  0.051 
LMI* D9601  0.186**  0.057      0.116  0.065 
Minority      -0.094  0.052  0.065  0.058 
Minority* D9601      0.235**  0.066  0.172*  0.074 
Ln(Employment)  -0.056**  0.013  -0.060**  0.013  -0.056**  0.013 
Corporation  0.037  0.028  0.037  0.028  0.038  0.028 
Partnership  0.010  0.053  0.014  0.053  0.014  0.053 
New Business  0.084**  0.028  0.093**  0.028  0.087**  0.028 
SIC_A  -0.150  0.101  -0.120  0.101  -0.144  0.101 
SIC_B  -0.331  0.253  -0.303  0.253  -0.318  0.253 
SIC_C  -0.459**  0.088  -0.445**  0.088  -0.454**  0.088 
SIC_D  -0.454**  0.079  -0.452**  0.079  -0.457**  0.079 
SIC_E  -0.348**  0.095  -0.345**  0.095  -0.350**  0.095 
SIC_F  -0.492**  0.083  -0.499**  0.083  -0.500**  0.083 
SIC_G  -0.562**  0.074  -0.553**  0.074  -0.560**  0.074 
SIC_H  -0.510**  0.123  -0.507**  0.123  -0.516**  0.123 
SIC_I  -0.475**  0.074  -0.466**  0.074  -0.475**  0.074 
Maturity3  0.094*  0.044  0.089*  0.044  0.085  0.044 
Maturity7  0.146**  0.033  0.143**  0.034  0.141**  0.033 
Low Doc   -0.105**  0.034  -0.099**  0.034  -0.101**  0.034 
Guarantee %  -4.211**  0.167  -4.196**  0.167  -4.188**  0.167 
PLP Lender  0.711**  0.040  0.705**  0.040  0.705**  0.040 
CLP Lender  0.169**  0.041  0.168**  0.041  0.171**  0.041 
             
F(LMI,Minority)  --    --    19.66**   
F(LMI*Time, Minority*Time)  --    --    7.92**   
Adjusted-R2  0.1083    0.1071    0.1093   
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Table 7 –  Dependent Variable Truncated at the 99
th and 95
th Percentiles 
Full specification, selected regression coefficients.  21,849 SBA loans originated between 1992 and 2001.  ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels.  The first F-test in each panel measures the joint significance of LMI 
and MINORITY.  The remaining F-tests in each panel measure the joint significance of each interaction LMI term 
and each comparable interaction MINORITY term (e.g., LMI*TIME and MINORITY*TIME).  
 
[1] 
no truncation  F-tests 
[2] 
99% truncation  F-tests 
[3] 
95% truncation  F-tests 
A. Continuous time             
Time  0.075**    0.064**    0.049**   
LMI   -0.379**  20.84**  -0.385**  21.55*  -0.393**  23.89* 
LMI*Time  0.032*  11.88**  0.035**  7.39*  0.032**  3.07** 
Minority  -0.006    0.019    0.054   
Minority*Time  0.038**    0.029*    0.003   
Adjusted-R2  0.1157    0.1008    0.0638   
B. Discrete time             
d1993  0.080    0.088    0.075   
d1994  0.139    0.141    0.119   
d1995  0.449**    0.431**    0.353**   
d1996  0.232**    0.228**    0.248**   
d1997  0.308**    0.303**    0.300**   
d1998  0.481**    0.412**    0.337**   
d1999  0.601**    0.525**    0.444**   
d2000  0.612**    0.544**    0.421**   
d2001  0.665**    0.623**    0.484**   
Lmi  -0.272*  2.09  -0.269*  2.15  -0.300**  3.12** 
lmi93  0.007  0.05  0.003  0.08  0.027  0.07 
lmi94  0.031  0.39  0.028  0.34  0.029  0.37 
lmi95  -0.072  0.69  -0.086  0.90  -0.046  0.79 
lmi96  -0.209  0.81  -0.200  0.82  -0.207  1.00 
lmi97  0.082  0.16  0.089  0.22  0.117  0.33 
lmi98  0.092  1.55  0.107  2.00  0.123  0.77 
lmi99  0.205  1.02  0.226  1.15  0.167  0.64 
lmi00  0.175  3.31*  0.181  2.28  0.203  1.26 
lmi01  0.186  1.31  0.185  0.78  0.206  0.57 
Minority  0.098    0.103    0.090   
minority93  -0.066    -0.074    -0.074   
minority94  0.138    0.124    0.120   
minority95  -0.141    -0.150    -0.157   
minority96  0.057    0.035    0.037   
minority97  0.003    0.012    -0.036   
minority98  0.240    0.262    0.086   
minority99  0.016    -0.022    -0.113   
minority00  0.318    0.218    0.041   
minority01  0.203    0.093    -0.055   
Adjusted-R2  0.1170    0.1027    0.0646   
C. Structural Change             
D9601  0.119**    0.093**    0.102**   
LMI   -0.303**  19.66**  -0.307**  21.57**  -0.314**  26.89** 
LMI* D9601  0.116  7.92**  0.133*  8.13**  0.109  3.19* 
Minority  0.065    0.060    0.041   
Minority* D9601  0.172*    0.150*    0.048   
Adjusted-R2  0.1093    0.0957    0.0607   
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Table 8 –  Eliminating Loans from 2001 
Full specification, selected regression coefficients comparing “Full Sample” of  21,849 SBA loans originated 
between 1992 and 2001 with “Restricted Sample” that does not include 798 loans originated in 2001.  ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels.  The first F-test in each panel measures the joint significance of LMI 
and MINORITY.  The remaining F-tests in each panel measure the joint significance of each interaction LMI term 
and each comparable interaction MINORITY term (e.g., LMI*TIME and MINORITY*TIME).  
 
[1] 
Unrestricted Sample  F-tests 
[2] 
Restricted Sample  F-tests 
A. Continuous time         
Time  0.075**    0.077**   
LMI   -0.379**  20.84**  -0.379**  20.15** 
LMI*Time  0.032*  11.88**  0.032*  10.82** 
Minority  -0.006    -0.010   
Minority*Time  0.038**    0.039**   
Adjusted-R2  0.116    .108   
B. Discrete time         
d1993  0.080    0.080   
d1994  0.139    0.140   
d1995  0.449**    0.449**   
d1996  0.232**    0.234**   
d1997  0.308**    0.310**   
d1998  0.481**    0.484**   
d1999  0.601**    0.604**   
d2000  0.612**    0.618**   
d2001  0.665**       
Lmi  -0.272*  2.09  -0.278*  2.14 
lmi93  0.007  0.05  0.008  .06 
lmi94  0.031  0.39  0.0318  .40 
lmi95  -0.072  0.69  -0.069  .69 
lmi96  -0.209  0.81  -0.208  .81 
lmi97  0.082  0.16  0.083  .17 
lmi98  0.092  1.55  0.092  1.57 
lmi99  0.205  1.02  0.206  1.04 
lmi00  0.175  3.31*  0.176  3.29* 
lmi01  0.186  1.31     
Minority  0.098    0.097   
minority93  -0.066    -0.067   
minority94  0.138    0.136   
minority95  -0.141    -0.142   
minority96  0.057    0.056   
minority97  0.003    0.003   
minority98  0.240    0.239   
minority99  0.016    0.01665   
minority00  0.318    0.32053   
minority01  0.203    0.09752   
Adjusted-R2  0.1170    .1103   
C. Structural Change         
D9601  0.119**    0.10847**   
LMI   -0.303**  19.66**  -0.3038**  19.98** 
LMI* D9601  0.116  7.92**  0.10775  7.39** 
Minority  0.065    0.06437   
Minority* D9601  0.172*    0.17263*   
Adjusted-R2  0.1093    .1014   
    32
Table 9 – Subsamples by Loan Size 
Full specification, but only selected regression coefficients are displayed.  







F-test  [2] 











A. Continuous Time             
Time  0.018**    0.115**    0.118**   
LMI   -0.371  11.03*  -0.395**  5.21*  -0.344*  4.04** 
LMI*Time  0.021*  6.49*  0.053*  4.03**  0.042  1.35 
Minority  -0.014    0.081    -0.087   
Minority*Time  0.049*    0.014    0.006   
Adjusted-R2  0.1186    0.1229    0.1204   
B. Discrete Time             
d1993  0.054    -0.013    0.101   
d1994  0.154    0.081    0.120   
d1995  0.502**    0.021    0.256   
d1996  0.058    0.268    0.228   
d1997  0.136    0.222    0.613**   
d1998  0.269*    0.431**    0.752**   
d1999  0.243*    0.676**    1.112**   
d2000  0.261*    0.811**    0.753**   
d2001  0.352*    0.979**    0.428   
Lmi  -0.325  1.37  -0.277  0.78  -0.222  0.62 
lmi93  0.087  0.84  -0.019  0.00  -0.062  1.14 
lmi94  0.160  0.18  0.014  0.03  -0.107  0.46 
lmi95  -0.110  0.84  0.038  0.04  0.397  1.83 
lmi96  -0.117  0.39  -0.346  0.54  -0.230  0.75 
lmi97  0.178  0.13  0.278  0.42  -0.626  1.53 
lmi98  0.111  0.44  0.135  1.62  0.119  0.21 
lmi99  0.213  0.79  0.302  1.58  0.182  2.00 
lmi00  0.085  2.11  0.278  0.72  0.466  0.84 
lmi01  0.040  0.85  0.568  1.22  0.330  0.24 
Minority  0.090    0.031    0.308   
minority93  0.116    0.033    -0.564   
minority94  0.224    0.064    -0.294   
minority95  -0.128    0.054    -0.743   
minority96  0.063    0.271    -0.349   
minority97  0.045    -0.203    0.123   
minority98  0.252    0.435    -0.265   
minority99  0.026    0.261    -0.831*   
minority00  0.495    0.074    -0.166   
minority01  0.388    -0.074    0.028   
Adjusted-R2  0.1234    0.1239    0.1257   
C. Structural Change             
D9601  -0.167**    0.465**    0.537*   
LMI   -0.344**  14.34**  -0.263**  3.51*  -0.169  2.54 
LMI* D9601  0.109  4.92**  0.193  2.43  0.019  0.27 
Minority  0.101    0.067    -0.112   
Minority* D9601  0.183*    0.114    0.071   
Adjusted-R2  0.1182    0.1130    .098   
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